University of Windsor

Scholarship at UWindsor
Law Publications

Faculty of Law

2012

Theorising Global Governance Inside-Out: A
Reply to Professor Ladeur
Sujith Xavier
University of Windsor, Faculty of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Xavier, Sujith. (2012). Theorising Global Governance Inside-Out: A Reply to Professor Ladeur. Transnational Legal Theory, 3 (2), 268.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/lawpub/103

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Law at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.

Theorising Global Governance Inside-Out: A Reply to Professor Ladeur 
Sujith Xavier
Keywords: Global Administrative Law; Global Governance; TWAIL; Public International
Law; International Criminal Law; Interdisciplinary Approaches to Law

ABSTRACT
Professor Ladeur argues that administrative law’s postmodernism (and by
extension Global Administrative Law) necessitates that we move beyond relying
on ideas of delegation, accountability and legitimacy. Global Governance,
particularly Global Administrative Law and Global Constitutionalism, should try to
adapt and experiment with the changing nature of the postmodern legality and
support the creation of norms that will adapt to the complexities of globalization.
Ladeur’s contestation, similar to GAL’s propositions, can be challenged. By
taking the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, a significant contributor to
the field of international criminal law as an example, it is suggested that the
creation of networks that Ladeur makes visible may not account for ‘regulatory
capture’. This paper will argue that from the outside, the proliferation of networks
may suggest that spontaneous accountability is possible. A closer look however,
drawing on anthropological insights from ICTR, reveals that international
institutions are susceptible to capture by special interests. Moreover there are
two central themes that animate the response to Professor Ladeur: the political
nature of international institutions and the history of international law and the role
of institutions in this history.
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Introduction
The multiplication of international and transnational interactions in recent years has prompted a
reimaging of the global order. This new image reflects the dense web of inchoate regulatory
regimes, actors, norms and processes,1 rather than the simple intercourse between sovereign
states. The task of mapping, describing and theorising different networks and webs is difficult,
complicated and, often, politically contested. In this context, there is a surge in scholarship that
conceptualises Global Governance through the lens of, for example, constitutional law,2
transnational law,3 legal pluralism4 and, more recently, administrative law.5
Professor Ladeur demonstrates Global Administrative Law’s (GAL’s) utility whilst
simultaneously providing incisive adjustments to its central tenets.6 Ladeur argues that
administrative law’s (and, by extension, GAL’s) postmodernism necessitates that we move
beyond relying on ideas of delegation, accountability and legitimacy. Global Governance,
particularly GAL and Global Constitutionalism, should try to adapt and experiment with the
changing nature of postmodern legality and support the creation of norms that will adapt to the
complexities of globalisation. Ladeur’s contestation, similar to GAL’s propositions, can be
challenged. By taking the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)—a significant
contributor to the field of international criminal law—as an example, it is suggested that the
creation of networks that Ladeur makes visible may not account for ‘regulatory capture’. This
paper will argue that from the outside, the proliferation of networks may suggest that spontaneous
accountability is possible. A closer look, however, drawing on anthropological insights from the

Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Law, Evolving’ in Jan M Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of
Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) 738.
2
Jan Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), The
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009); Ronald St John Macdonald and
Douglas M Johnston, Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues on the Legal Ordering of the World
Community (Martinus Nihjoff, 2005); Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and
International Regimes’ (2009) 16 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 621. But see Jose E Alvarez,
‘The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Consequences’ (2003) 38 (3) Texas International Law
Journal 421.
3
Peer Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Leal Pluralism’ (2010) 1(2) Transnational Legal Theory 141.
4
Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
5
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’
(2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15; Nico Krisch and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘Introduction:
Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 European
Journal of International Law 1; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Administrative Law Frontier in Global
Governance’ (2005) ASIL Proceedings 143; Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The Concept of “Law” in Global
Administrative Law’ (2009) 20(1) European Journal of International Law 23.
6
Karl-Heinz Ladeur ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law and Transnational Regulation’, this
volume, xxx.
1
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ICTR, reveals that international institutions are susceptible to capture by special interests.
Moreover, there are two central themes that animate the response to Professor Ladeur: the
political nature of international institutions, and the history of international law and the role of
institutions in this history. In what follows, I will briefly describe Ladeur’s central arguments and
situate these claims vis-à-vis the already complicated but burgeoning body of scholarship on
GAL. Thereafter the analysis will draw on empirical studies from the ICTR to suggest that
networks (in this instance international criminal justice institutions) are susceptible to capture by
special interests.
Ladeur’s Evolutionary Process in Administrative Law and GAL
Professor Karl-Heinz Ladeur’s contribution seeks to confront the recent attempts in global
governance to map and shape7 the existing international legal order based on our understanding of
the nation state. For example, Global Constitutionalism scholars use the nation state as a potential
solution to the legitimacy crisis. Global Constitutionalism and the search for unity is an attempt to
bring the formality of the state to the international scale as a potential mechanism for the
‘startlingly facile resolution of conflict[s] and contestation[s]’.8 Yet given the fragmentation of
private and public spheres and the transformation of the legal system, which undoubtedly affect
our conceptions of democratic governance, Ladeur suggests that GAL may provide a much more
meaningful way to manage and stabilise the complexities of the emerging regimes. The focus
should therefore turn to the ‘fragmented like character of law as it is’.9 In particular there ought to
be greater reflection on the self-construction and auto-constitution of the legal order in
international legal theory.10
Ladeur tests his hypothesis by considering the ‘evolution of modern administrative law’ to
examine how progress in this field can help us to understand domestic, transnational and global
law. One of the central tenets is that ‘administration’, rather than the legislators and courts,
produce domestic administrative law. Ladeur thus suggests that the paradigms of administrative
law have undergone serious changes over the last decade from ‘the construction and decision of
individual cases to industry related regulation’.11 There is a new postmodern model of
administrative action that is motivated by experimentation and learning, reflecting the
transformation of culture. The proliferation of different forms of communication and the rise of
Mattias Kumm et al, ‘Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2012)
1(1) Global Constitutionalism 1.
8
Ladeur (n 6) xx.
9
Ibid, xx.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
7
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information technology have managed to break down existing modes of communication. The
change in communication has resulted in specialised epistemic communities and highly
specialised networks, or a society of networks.12
Within this postmodern reality, the role of the state has been dramatically altered, yet the state has
not lost its relevance. The state does not retreat or vanish. Rather it has assumed the ‘role of a
player with the responsibility for the rules of the game’ to regulate the ‘polycentric practices of
experimentation in the “private” realm [which] produce lock-ins as well as perverse effects’.13
Based on this societal transformation, Ladeur theorises a new perspective for GAL as a
possibility. The network-like character of transnational administrative law is not new, rather it is a
continuation ‘of the fragmentation and, as a consequence, the increasingly loose coupling of the
different layers of the normative system of postmodernity which can be observed at the domestic
level’.14 Once we understand that the domestic system is not structured by a unified normative
order, it is much easier to fathom its expansion to the international and transnational levels.
Ladeur’s arguments thus far seem somewhat different from the central tenets of GAL. GAL’s
central goal is to deploy administration as Global Governance. Such a positioning allows those
working under the auspice of GAL to ‘recast many standard concerns about the legitimacy of
international institutions in a more specific and focused way’.15 This approach, the supporters of
GAL argue, enables the unsettling of orthodox understandings of the concept of law within the
transnational space.
If GAL is to describe law in the international setting, Kingsbury suggests, then it is a claim that
‘diverges from, and can be sharply in tension with the classical models of consent-based interstate international law and most models of national law’.16 He then elucidates the concept of law
that is implicated within GAL, which takes on a transnational character, uprooted from the nation
state. Within this context, GAL is something that is wholly different from administrative law
found within national jurisdictions. National administrative law is a product of political
compromises between legitimate political actors, whilst international law emanates from a
dizzying array of actors and norm producers.
Such an account is in contrast to Ladeur’s conceptualisation of the evolutionary process shaping
domestic notions of law and resulting in overlapping and interconnected dimensions in the
production of the legal order. Ladeur, unlike other supporters of GAL, suggests that the
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, ‘Constitutionalism and the State of the “Society of Networks”: The Design of a New
“Control Project” for a Fragmented Legal System’ (2011) 2(4) Transnational Legal Theory 463.
13
Ladeur (n 6) xx.
14
Ibid, xx.
15
Kingsbury 2009 (n 5) 27.
16
Ibid.
12
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democratic nature of law should not be over-emphasised. Prior to the development of postmodern
administrative law, arguably a direct link could be made between law’s accountability to its
democratic constituents and its goals. Moreover Ladeur notes that within the context of domestic
administrative governance, accountability cannot be reduced ‘to the control of compliance
rules’.17 The postmodern nature of society has thus had a fundamental effect on the relationship
between law and ‘its cognitive infrastructure’, precipitating the evolution of the legal system with
the creation of new accountability regimes called ‘entangled hierarchies’.18 These are
characterised by the erosion between the design of the rules and their application. As a direct
result, there is the emergence of spontaneous accountability generated by networks. These
regimes are not defined in advance but rather are constituted through a process of network
activity. The control mechanisms conceptualised at the state level cannot help in this instance and
thus a reconfiguration is necessary.
The notion that law must have a public law element, particularly in light of postmodern insights,
may also seem misleading. The postmodern nature of law, given the rise of the society of
organisations and then networks,19 necessitated that administrative law adapt and give way to new
explicit ‘re-formulation and re-modifications of the whole architecture of the normative
system’.20 In a similar vein, questions about ‘lawness’ of GAL must take stock of the changing
nature of domestic law within the postmodern moment. Thus for Ladeur there are striking
similarities between domestic and transnational administrative law which undoubtedly have an
effect on the way we conceptualise GAL.
The democratic deficit in international organisations is one of GAL’s central motivators. Ladeur
argues that such a perspective is overstated. By taking a sharp look at the democratic function of
law, Ladeur argues that the role of the state at times requires interfering with individual rights
where parliamentary oversight is necessary. Simultaneously, the state is involved in norm
creation which ‘transform[s] the conditions for the use of rights but do[es] not infringe upon
subjective rights in the traditional sense’.21 Thus the new addressees of administrative action are
more and more complex networks. The rise of global administrative structures and the fast
emerging norms that regulate these networks subsequently strengthen the ‘autonomy of
administrative function’. In this sense, global law must be thought of in procedural terms (‘as a
law which produces its own preconditions for validity and recognition, beyond the sphere of the

17

Ladeur (n 6) xx.
Ibid, xx.
19
Ladeur (n 12).
20
Ladeur (n 6) xx.
21
Ibid, xx.
18
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state’)22 that is part and parcel of a fragmented context which is “characterised by a

random coming together of national, conventional international and self‐organised
global law, on the one hand, and similarly heterogeneous cognitive rules […]”
Ladeur’s GAL can therefore draw on ‘components of both the more hybrid loosely coupled type
of the law of networks, which emerges at the domestic level, and on components of the new
public international law which shatters the hitherto established clear separation from the statebased law’.23 Fundamentally, the source of law can no longer be viewed as stemming from
canonical texts. Instead, Ladeur suggests that legal meaning must be generated from several
overlapping texts and practices which encompasses an ‘experimental approach’ that includes both
domestic and transnational contexts. He uses different examples (from investment protection and
environmental governance) to suggest that in these fields, GAL may allow ‘for the development
of rules below the rather rigid structure of public international law’.24
This account, however, does not demonstrate the role of special interests (or narrow interest) in
the evolutionary process in society.25 Ladeur, while noting and taking stock of the dynamic shifts
within the domestic and national accounts of administration, does not illustrate glimpses of
‘who’s in and who’s out’ in this process that describes the move from cases to regulation.
Ladeur’s version of the evolutionary process within the national narratives of specific fields of
law, as a move away from the legislators and the judges to one that is governed by networks,
simply omits to mention the embedded power structures within and amongst these networks that
is reflected in contemporary societal structures.26
Ladeur is correct in identifying the rise of networks, but this does not necessarily imply that these
networks are impregnable to regulatory capture by special interest groups or narrow interests. For
international relations theorists, regulatory capture denotes the control of the ‘regulatory process
by those whom it is supposed to regulate’ or by a small group of those affected by regulation,
‘with the consequence that regulatory outcomes favor the narrow “few” at the expense of society
as a whole’.27 Similar to the realist accounts of the common law legal framework’s partiality for

22

Ibid, xx.
Ibid, xx.
24
Ibid, xx.
25
W Mattli and N Woods, ‘In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global Politics’ in Walter
Mattli and Ngaire Woods (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009) 5;
David Charney, ‘Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: “Norms” in Contractual Relationships’ (1996) 144
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1841; Patricia J Williams, Alchemy of Race and Rights: Diary of a
Law Professor (Harvard University Press, 1991).
26
Charney, ibid.
27
Mattli and Woods (n 25) 14.
23
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large-scale capitalist American economy of the nineteenth century28 and critical international law
scholars’ use of history to trace international law’s complicity in colonialism,29 universalist
characterisations of Global Governance devoid of interdisciplinary insights about the nature of
globalisation must be challenged.
Ladeur may be accurate in identifying the global administrative space and its ability to generate
self-regulation (as a form of spontaneous accountability). Accountability, however, is tied to
specific biases endemic in those interests that have captured the spontaneous accountability
producing mechanisms.30 For example, the United Nations Security Council’s attempts to deliver
justice and end impunity in the former Balkans and Rwanda led to the creation of the two ad hoc
international criminal tribunals. These tribunals have nonetheless been captured by special
interests31 bent on prosecuting those most responsible for the heinous crimes, even in cases where
there is a clear lack of evidentiary basis to proceed.32 Moreover, and building on the political
nature of spontaneous accountability creation, insights from a historical perspective of
international law demonstrate the use of international law to universalise a specific set of values
and traditions.33 Such insights reveal that international law is not neutral in how it operates.
Rather, there are embedded politics that are prevalent within the structure of international law.34
ICTR witness testimony is an illustrative example in which there is regulatory capture by interests
that want to facilitate and expedite the prosecutions of alleged perpetrators of international
crimes, which may be analogous to the use of international law to further colonial expansion and
imperialism as witnessed through the civilising mission. Particularly when the objectivity of
adjudicators, litigators and witnesses is pried open and interrogated, there seems to be a marked
Roscoe Pound, ‘A Call For a Realist Jurisprudence’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 697; Felix Cohen,
‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’ (1935) 35 Columbia Law Review 809; Elizabeth
Mensch, ‘The History of Mainstream Legal Thought’ in David Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law: A
Progressive Critique (Pantheon, 1998) 21.
29
Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
30
David Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ in Jeffrey L Dunoff and Joel P Trachtman (eds),
Ruling the World; Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (Cambridge University
Press, 2009).
31
Elena A Baylis, ‘Tribunal-Hopping with the Post-Conflict Justice Junkies’ (2008) 10 Oregon Review of
International Law 361.
32
Nancy A Combs, Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International
Criminal Convictions (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
33
Anghie (n 29).
34
Makau Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31;
Antony Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law
Proceedings 39; Obiora C Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL):
Theory, Methodology, or Both?’ (2010) 10 International Community Law Review 37; JT Gathii, ‘TWAIL:
A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3(1) Trade,
Law & Development 26.
28
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absence of understanding and accurately interpreting the witness testimony that supports the
decisions rendered.
Ladeur’s contribution seeks to clarify and add to a central feature of GAL, as conceptualised thus
far by its proponents. The primary concern raised above of who’s in and who’s out nonetheless
remains. In what follows, ICTR will be presented as an example of Ladeur’s self-organised
network which was forged by those who were part of the new network of judges, UN officials
and other stakeholders (civil society activists and government officials, amongst others) in trying
to stop impunity. By taking the ICTR as an example, this paper will demonstrate that these
networks are susceptible to capture, both by institutional bias and by political interests that run
deep within the very structure of international law.35 Professor Ladeur’s insights are a significant
contribution to the existing GAL literature. Such insights must, however, take account of the rise
of special interests, particularly in light of the rise of the knowledge society, if they are to depict
the ascertainable reality within the international institutions.36
ICTR: An Example of ‘Spontaneous Accountability’?
The nascent field of international criminal law has progressed leaps and bounds. The ICTR37 was
one of the first international criminal institutions to be established by the United Nations Security
Council through its Chapter VII Charter powers to maintain peace and security.38 The creation of
this institution was made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War. The long struggle of the international human rights movement(s)39 to create legal
mechanisms to enforce the applicable international criminal law that had evolved through state
practice and custom made a significant contribution to the creation of this institution. The
networks of international human rights movement(s), along with sympathetic Member States of
the United Nations, worked hard to fill, based on their political and ideological perspectives, the
accountability gap for mass human rights violations. The ICTR (as set out in the respective
resolution40) sought to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for the violation of
international humanitarian law, to render justice to the victims, to deter future crimes, and to
35

Anghie (n 29); Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonizing International Law: Development, Economic Growth and
the Politics of Universality (Oxford University Press, 2011).
36
Samuel Moyn, ‘Judith Shklar on the Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ (2012),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2148437 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2148437 (accessed 19 December 2012).
37
R Lee, ‘The Rwanda Tribunal’ (1996) 9 Leiden Journal of International Law 37. The Rwandan tribunal
shares the appeal chamber and the prosecutor with the ICTY.
38
United Nations Charter, 26 June 1945, 39 AJIL 190 Supp, (entered into force 24 October 1945).
39
Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (HUP, 2010).
40
United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution 827,
S/RES/827 (1993); United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, UNSCOR, 49th Session, 3453rd
Meeting, UN Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
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restore peace by ending impunity in the region.41 The International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was created prior to the ICTR, but in a similar manner.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East were the first international criminal fora for prosecuting war crimes, crimes against
humanity and other crimes committed during armed conflict. Since then, numerous international
criminal legal doctrines have been forged to combat impunity (such as the crime of genocide42
and more recently the crime of aggression43). The creation of these two international ad hoc
mechanisms paved the way for an international criminal court.44 In 1996, the United Nations
General Assembly established the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court. The Committee, within two years, drafted the Statute and in July
1998 the Statute was adopted by 120 votes to seven. The Statute entered into force on 1 July
2002. Simultaneously, there were numerous other special international mechanisms created to
tackle the growing demand for international justice. For example, the Special Panels for Serious
Crime for East Timor (SPSC), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary
Chamber in the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) were
created between 1999 and 2007. The SPSC was set up through the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor, while the United Nations and the respective governments of Sierra
Leone and Cambodia created the SCSL and ECCC. The UN Security Council established the
STL using its Charter powers. As these international criminal institutions mete out judgments, the
politics of international criminal justice is becoming evident, particularly as it relates to who is
selected for prosecution. Moreover, the development of procedural law within these institutions
points to the political nature of international prosecutions, which is further embedded within the
politics of international law.
The statutes of the ICTY and ICTR respectively require the judges to draft and adopt Rules of
Evidence and Procedure (REP) for the ‘conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials
and appeals, the admissions of evidence, the protection of victims and witness and other
appropriate matters’.45 Moreover, the ICTR Statute enables it to adopt the REP of the ICTY.46
Sarah Williams, ‘ICTY and ICTR (Completion Strategy)’ in Antonio Cassese (ed), Oxford Companion to
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) 362–3.
42
Reservation to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [1951] ICJ
Rep 1951.
43
Christoph Safferling, International Criminal Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2012).
44
Ibid, 48.
45
Art 15 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827, UNSCOR, 3217th Meeting, UNSC Resolution
827, S/RES/827 (1993).
46
Art 14 United Nations Security Council Resolution 955, UNSCOR, 49th Session, 3453rd Meeting, UN
Doc S/RES/955 (1994).
41
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ICTY judges, in drafting the rules, included a provision that allowed for amendments to the rules
based on the day-to-day needs of the tribunal. This practice has evolved and has culminated in a
streamlined process through the Rules Committee.47 Proposal for amendments are made by
Judges, the Prosecutor and/or the Registrar and these amendments can be adopted at the plenary
meeting of the Tribunal (closed sessions) or unanimously adopted with the approval of the
Permanent Judges. The REP may illustrate Ladeur’s ideas of the self-regulating network that is
able to generate its own form of accountability.
Focusing on the issue of witness testimony, the Rules Committee has amended and revised on
numerous occasions the rules relating to the standard of admitting evidence and witness
testimony generally. Yet empirical evidence from the field suggests that these changes to the
rules have not been successful, either in terms of flexibility or expeditious trials or—more
importantly—in protecting the rights of the accused.48 Rather, the anomalies reported by insights
from the field may be attributable to the flexible nature of the rules and the role of the judges.49
The discussion below will use empirical evidence from the ICTR to show that spontaneous
legitimacy is not possible, given the pro-conviction bias of the tribunal. On the heels of this
discussion, the paper will turn to explore the regulatory capture of transnational criminal space by
special interest groups that seek to end impunity, even though adequate evidence to substantiate
the rationale for conviction is lacking.

Locating the Cultural Local: Witness Testimony In Administering Justice
Recent studies have made available divergent accounts of how the ICTR functions. In this regard,
what emerges from within is in stark contrast to claims to spontaneous accountability endemic in
networks as suggested by Ladeur. The networks that Ladeur chooses (investment protection
regimes and environmental governance50) bear striking resemblances to the international criminal
justice networks described earlier. My assertion is premised on the culture and context in which
this institution operates. The central concern is the inability of witnesses to accurately convey
their stories to the trier of fact. This inability stems from the specific culture of Rwanda and its
Megan A Fairlie, ‘Rulemaking from the Bench: A Place for Minimalism at the ICTY’ (2003–4) 39 Texas
International Law Journal 262.
48
Mazimo Langer and Joseph W Doherty, ‘Managerial Judging Goes International but its Promise Remains
Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms’ (2011) 36(2) Yale Journal of International
Law 242.
49
Combs (n 32); Kamari M Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the
Challenges of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Tim Kelsall,
Culture under Cross-Examination: International Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).
50
Ladeur (n 6) xx.
47
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colonial past.51 Moreover, the use of the adjudicatory process is the imposition of Western
understandings of how to conduct investigations and trials and elicit witness testimony, which
may diverge from the local customs and conceptions of the people involved.52
Nancy Combs reviews the transcripts of witness testimony from the ICTR.53 She points to a
systematic hurdle that has plagued the institution: how to grapple with local witnesses? More
relevantly, she demonstrates that there is a direct disjuncture between evidence that is provided
by witnesses and the adjudicatory process. ‘In sum, Trial Chambers often seem content to base
convictions on highly problematic witness testimony.’54 As a result, the Chambers fail to find
‘reasonable doubt in some of the most doubtful instances and as a consequence, convict just about
every defendant who comes before them’.55 Through a painstaking review of trial transcripts,
Combs identifies that witnesses are often unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times
and specific location of the events or, more importantly, place the perpetrator accurately at the
scene of the crime. Combs notes that these discrepancies are a result of educational, cultural and
translation related factors.
In our understanding of domestic criminal prosecutions, witnesses called in to testify are expected
to provide a detailed account of who did what to whom. Scholars working in domestic criminal
law, however, have pointed out that witness testimony is deeply flawed because of numerous
insights, particularly from race, gender and mental health angles.56 Comparative criminal law
suggests that certain national jurisdictions are protective of the rights of the accused and thus
prohibit the use of the death penalty in cases that rely solely on eyewitness testimony.57 Examples
from specific jurisdictions in the United States illustrate that each State must produce DNA
evidence, which can be buttressed by witness testimony in order to avail of the death penalty.58
Such insights into the unreliability of witness testimony have yet to find their way into
international criminal law.
51

Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda
(Princeton University Press, 2002).
52
Combs (n 32) 3.
53
Ibid, 4.
54
Ibid, 222.
55
Ibid; Importantly, Combs suggests that the judges are not ‘convicting innocent defendants’. Rather what
she is suggesting is ‘that the Trial Chambers’ cavalier attitude towards fact finding impediments is
inconsistent with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof as that standard is traditionally
understood’.
56
David M Tanovich, ‘The Charter of Whiteness: Twenty-Five Years of Maintaining Racial Injustice in the
Canadian Criminal Justice System’ (2008) 40 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 655; David M Tanovich,
‘Moving Beyond “Driving While Black”: Race, Suspect Description and Selection’ (2005) 36 Ottawa Law
Review 315; Sandra G Thompson, ‘Judicial Gatekeeping of Police-Generated Witness Testimony’ (2011)
University of Houston Law Center No 2011-A-8.
57
Thompson, ibid.
58
Ibid.
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Within international criminal law debates, the primary focus has been on the substantive legality
of international criminal adjudication. The literature thus far has concentrated on setting out and
developing specific areas of substantive international criminal law.59 Even though there are
numerous accounts of problematic features of institutional practices from defence counsel60 and
academics with specific institutional knowledge of international mechanisms,61 and
interdisciplinary insights from political scientists and anthropologists,62 the focus on the
mechanics of the institutions, especially as they relate to international criminal procedure, is
minimal.63 There are various calls to incorporate diversity into the existing framework64 or
criticisms of the problematic nature of admitting faulty evidence;65 nonetheless, very little
attention is paid to the critical insights emerging from domestic criminal jurisdictions with regard
to witness testimony.
The rationale behind the absence of this type of analysis is twofold. First, unlike the Nuremberg
Tribunal Prosecutors, who relied exclusively on documents prepared by Nazi officials to establish
guilt, ICTR prosecutors rely exclusively on witness testimony.66 Modern day international
criminals, especially those indicted by the ICTR, did not leave a trail of documentary evidence
that could be used by the Prosecution. Secondly, the REP of the ad hoc tribunals were drafted and
amended by the judges, prosecutors and other officials of the tribunals. The conversations have
therefore focused on the institutional and meritorious aspects of the REP and the degree to which
common law and civil law traditions have influenced the development of these rules.67 Ultimately

59

See eg M Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law (Transnational Press, 2004);
Antonio Cassese (ed), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press,
2009); Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 2003); Robert Cryer et al,
An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
60
Wayne Jordash, ‘The Practice of “Witness Proofing” in International Criminal Tribunals: Why the
International Criminal Court should Prohibit the Practice’ (2009) Leiden Journal of International Law 22.
61
Alexander Zahar and Göran Sluiter, International Criminal Law: A Critical Introduction (Oxford
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the exclusion of critical insights from the domestic context, which questions the viability of using
witness testimony, were left out or ignored. The role of experts in this development is significant.
Even though ICTR witnesses understand that the Rwandan President’s plane was shot down on 6
April 1994, precipitating the genocide (the most significant date for the Tribunal), they are not
able to place perpetrators at the scene of the crime on a specific date. The rationale is simply
cultural. Some witnesses cannot relay events based on the Western calendar, or they lack formal
western-style education to respond to questions about specific dates and times. The prosecutors
and most international staff conducting the investigations, trials and legal research are western.68
For example, in the Nahimana proceedings, a trial witness testified that Colonel Rwendeye had
attended two death-squad meetings in 1993–4. When the witness was confronted with evidence
that the Colonel had in fact died in 1990, the witness rejected the evidence and maintained that
the Colonel had in fact died in 1992. ‘When it was pointed out that the [witness’s] revision
nonetheless made [the Colonel] the only dead man at the meetings, [the witness] claimed that he
had testified that the meetings had taken place at the end of 1992 and 1993.’69
More importantly, and often, witnesses use cultural practices to identify events (for example, the
seasons determine the time of year). These practices are culturally specific and contingent.
Similarly, the notion of temporality or temporal sequences of events is arguably another issue of
contention, where witnesses are unable to provide the exact timeline along which the alleged
incitement to genocide occurred.
Problematically, the judges of the Tribunal have proceeded to accept ‘faulty witness testimonies’
for compelling reasons. Often the accused perpetrators were clearly involved in the Rwandan
genocide given their political affiliations, which is the central basis for conviction. The judges
rely on these factors to credit witness testimonies. There is an 85 per cent conviction rate in the
ICTR, which clearly corroborates Combs’ claims. Even when there are glaring inconsistencies in
testimonies, Combs notes that the ‘[T]rial Chambers explain these away as products of the
passage of time, the frailty of memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters’.70
From a broader perspective, the adjudicatory process envisioned by these tribunals is predicated
on western common law (adversarial) and civil law (inquisitorial) traditions.71 Both traditions rely
heavily on witness testimony and the judges (and the Tribunal as whole) have adopted these
traditions as the modus operandi. Thus, by using the western trial form, ‘international criminal
proceedings cloak themselves in the form’s garb of fact-finding competence, but it is only a
68
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cloak, for many of the key assumptions that underlie the Western trial form do not exist in the
international context’.72
As noted earlier, the UN Security Council granted the judges of the two ad hoc Tribunals the
power to draft (and amend) their own respective rules of evidence and procedure, which may
have provided the perfect tool to rectify—or in Ladeur’s words, self-regulate—these anomalies.
Moreover, the very design of the trial process (and even pre-trial investigation) was left up to the
judges of the two tribunals to determine as they saw fit. Given these conclusions, what we have
right now is a disconnect between the substantive evidence (based on witness testimonies) and the
mandate of the tribunals to prosecute those with the gravest responsibility for the mass atrocities,
whilst respecting the rights of the accused to due process.
The changes to the rules are predicated, however, on efficiency and expeditious trials that would
not run up the costs of international justice. This disconnect is based on the bias of the judges
(and the tribunals).73 The pro-conviction bias of the judges may possibly stem from their personal
background and their expertise. Within the Rwandan context, political affiliations signal to the
tribunals the potential culpability of the accused. These factors ultimately lend support to the
belief that the accused participated in the genocide, even without the ‘beyond-reasonable-doubt’
threshold given the faulty witness testimonies.
Regulatory Capture: Who’s in and Who’s out?
The employees of these tribunals are central to the pro-conviction bias dealt with earlier. Judges
are selected from a pool of candidates through the United Nations, and approved by the United
Nations Security Council as set out by the Statute and the respective rules of each tribunal. Most
judges move from one tribunal to another given the scarcity of expertise in international criminal
law.74
The tribunal is staffed by United Nations employees (from legal associates and prosecution
attorneys to in-house translators). In this regard, there has emerged a class of international
employees who work on ‘post-conflict justice issues and who maintain an itinerant lifestyle in
pursuit of that work’, moving from one hotspot to another within these tribunals.75 For example,
Elena Baylis tells the story of young aspiring activists and advocates trying to make a difference
by transferring their social activist legal training from western institutions to conflict hotspots and
international criminal institutions. These good intentions, however, are clouded by what Baylis
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demonstrates as the known unknowns.76 These known unknowns are characterised as a ‘lack of
local knowledge of post-conflict settings, whether that is knowledge of the local legal system,
local facts, local culture or any other relevant information’.77 Moreover, Baylis argues that these
known unknowns are notoriously hard to deal with since there are issues of lack of timing, false
expertise, complexity, and size of the local context. False expertise stems from the very nature of
the work that is undertaken and the ability to transfer these skills to other hotspots. These
international experts spend no more than two to three years at each tribunal as they follow the
spread of international criminal justice.
In this context, the role of experts within networks, contrary to Ladeur’s propositions, is not
value neutral. David Kennedy’s insights indeed suggest that the background norms of institutions
are more important in global governance than originally thought.78 The political values of experts
within the tribunals in effect shape the outcome of the process. These experts manage the
background norms that permeate the value structure of the tribunals. As Kennedy has highlighted,
what really matters at the global governance level is not what is in the foreground (the tribunals)
or the context (Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia). Rather,

the work of the background has colonized the foreground and the context. The
foreground increasingly seems a mere spectacle—a performance to which we
attribute agency, interest and ideology. At the same time, it is difficult to locate
elements of context, which are not constructed by people managing background
norms and institutions. Indeed, the foreground and the context may well turn out to
be effects of background practices.79

It does matter that the judges and their experts have a pro-conviction bias, which may be rooted
inherently in the way international law is constructed, as part of the civilising mission.80 Lack of
training and cultural competencies with regard to the local context has a significant influence on
outcomes. This bias within the network does have a detrimental effect on those theorising about
the possibility of Global Governance and the creation of spontaneous accountability within the
global administrative space. The detriment, therefore, is that the regulatory capture of any
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network is potentially inevitable and represents one of the significant problematic features of
Global Governance.

Conclusion: Theorising International Law Inside Out
The history of international law demonstrates that there are discrepancies between universal legal
concepts, their rationality and their contemporary application. For example, Grotius’ attempts to
curtail the raw power of the sovereign by creating new rules in the form of international law is a
universal claim rooted in Eurocentrism.81 International legal historians, however, have revealed
that international law, and sovereignty doctrine in particular, was used largely to regulate
encounters between local inhabitants of the new world and the European colonisers.82 As
international law evolved, moving away from natural law to positivism, it is the concretisation of
a new field.83 Yet what is undeniable is that this development of international law in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is closely tied to the continuation of colonialism and
imperialism.84 By the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the accelerated drive of
international law had resulted in an abundance of international institutions set up to deal with the
world’s problems, such as delivering aid to those in need and dealing with health related issues.
This created a new international space that necessitated describing and then theorising the
international space, given the push of globalisation and the changing nature of the nation state.
GAL, as part of the Global Governance debate, is one incarnation of these attempts to describe
the existing international landscape using domestic understanding of administration as potentially
embodied by administrative law that includes principles such as transparency and accountability,
amongst others.
International law scholars have used vast amounts of ink trying first to articulate, and
subsequently to study and describe, the international legal order. The foregoing analysis suggests
that Global Governance debates that attempt to describe the international legal architecture may
succumb to a peripheral reading of international institutions. These characterisations do not
adequately reflect the inherent realities of these institutions. The analysis focused on the recent
field of GAL and Ladeur’s contribution to GAL, as a possible distinct description of the
international legal order. In so doing, this paper introduced the ICTR as a case study to illustrate,
on the one hand, how Global Governance and GAL may portray the contemporary international
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space that is seen by international scholars from a cursory top-down perspective. On the other
hand, the analysis demonstrated how conceptions of Global Governance broadly, and GAL
specifically, elides, obscures and effaces the underlying context within the international legal
order.
More concretely, Professor Ladeur has made a significant contribution to our existing
understanding of GAL as part of the Global Governance discussion. As highlighted earlier,
Ladeur suggests that GAL must take account of administrative law’s postmodernism and thus
existing articulations of GAL must transcend notions of delegation, accountability and legitimacy
as means to secure legitimacy within the global space. These concepts, Ladeur notes, are wedded
to older understanding of the nation state that do not account for societal transformation. The new
societal transformation, as part of the evolutionary process, has ushered in the creation of
spontaneous accountability by networks. GAL’s focus, therefore, should not be on generating
control of compliance rules. Rather, by focusing on the entangled hierarchies and generating
spontaneous accountability through the rise of networks, GAL can take postmodern
understandings of administration and open up new vistas in Global Governance thinking. Ladeur
uses environmental governance as a potential site to illustrate his articulation of GAL. What he
ignores is that environmental protection regimes cannot simply adopt western state-centric
perspectives to protect environmental resources. Rather, context specific insights (for example
indigenous knowledge and political economy claims) must be incorporated into the existing
understandings of environmental protection.
In this regard, Ladeur is correct in pointing to the rise of networks and their potential to generate
accountability. Yet what is undeniable, as illustrated by the ICTR case study, is that networks are
susceptible to regulatory capture by special interest groups. The foregoing examination of witness
testimony and the role of experts within the ICTR reveals that special interests have managed to
take over by insisting on prosecuting those most responsible for the crimes, even in cases where
there is insufficient or unsound evidence to proceed. Such regulatory capture coincides with
historical insights into the nature of international law and its potential for universalising specific
narratives. For example, the sovereignty doctrine was forged to regulate the encounter between
Europeans and uncivilised locals. The doctrine developed within a specific socio-political context
in which European empires sought to control their newly acquired territories and inhabitants.85
Importantly, the origins of international law foster a specific ‘set of structures that continually
repeat themselves at various stages in the history of the discipline’.86 This particular dynamic of
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international law therefore encourages regulatory capture by emphasising specific sets of values
and traditions. Arguably, Combs’ study drives home the notion that there are explicit decisions
being made on the ground which may push against and most often contradict the facts deployed
by Global Governance experts, especially GAL scholars.
Ultimately, these characterisations of international institutions and the various international
regulatory bodies are missing the mark by focusing solely on the top-down perspective, rather
than embracing the internal truths emblematic of these institutions. Depicting a very singular
narrative that focuses on the facts, as witnessed by those in Berlin, Hamburg, London and New
York, and theorising from this perspective may not yield any results that actually help us to
understand the different political compromises involved and how these institutions are created
and operate. The description of the international legal order cannot be a single story.
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